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So much for the first sentence of the conclusion, quoted above. T he court 
must build political support. This, moreover must be ' its own political 
support'. 
When Moseneke DCJ in a recent public lecture declared that the court 
should be 'pro- poor ', he was no doubt referring to the web of provisions in 
the Bill of Rights which promote the protection and advancement of the 
impoverished. He could not have meant that the court would always hold for 
the poor, by dint of'strategies' and 'doctrines'. It has not done so (as several of 
its decisions reflect), and cannot do so, if its compass is law. Raux has it 
otherwise. 'Politics' become entire, which of course it must do if the court 
itself has to build 'its own political support'. 'Principle' is chimerical. 
How this so much as touches sides with the principle of legali ty, the 
division of powers and the mle oflaw will leave readers bemused. If they seek 
to orient themselves in this regard by searching for the author's grasp of 
Pharmaceutical Mamifacturers Associatio11 cif SA : !11 re ex parte Preside/// cif the RSA 
2000 (2) SA 674 (CC), they will not find it. (The search must be manual, 
because unaccountably the book lacks a case index). 
JEREMY GAUNTLETT SC 
Cape a~~d jolw1111esbwg Bars 
The Politics cif Pri11ciple: The First South Africa// Collsliluliollal Court, 
1995- 2005. Dy T heunis Roux. Cambridge University Press. 2013. xii 
and pp 433. Price R360.00 (soft cover). 
T heunis R a ux's important book, The Politics cif Pri11ciple: The First South 
Africa// Col/stitutiollal Court, 1995-2005, is a tightly reasoned and wide-
ranging assessment of the Constitutional Court's first decade. It sets out to 
explain what we must mean when we speak of our admiration for the court 
in these years (the 'Chaskalson Court' , as Raux appropriately calls it), and 
then to trace the elements of the court's decisions that earned that admira-
tion. 
To explain what is admired in the court's work is much more difficult than 
it might seem. We might say that the court rendered good decisions - but 
good in what sense? O r we might say that the court dealt successfully with 
the institutional challenges it faced - but what were those challenges, and 
what did successfully dealing with them entail? 
Roux has a lot to say about each of these questions, to which I shall return, 
but his central thesis is that what makes the court admirable is that it 
successfully handled both tasks - wise adjudication and effective institu-
tional functioning - at the same time, and despite the seemingly inevitable 
trade-offs between them (3). His argument, in short, is that the Constitu-
tional Court succeeded in those years in being both principled and politic. 
Roux is surely right that we do want and need constitutional courts to be 
both of these. An impolitic court is, sooner or later, a court that o thers, more 
politic and powerful than the judges, will overwhelm. An injudicious court 
-
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may still wield authority, but we wi ll not relish its rule, and at some point we 
will cease to view its decisions as based in law. 
H e is also surely tight that these two objectives are, as they say, in tension. 
A decision that deftly avoids an unwelcome confrontation with political 
branches of the state may sustain a court's long tem1 influence - but it may 
also rest on reasoning that stretches or simply tears the bo unds of argument 
that the legal community asserts. In the second chapter of his book, Roux 
explores this tension in rich comparative detail, taking into account the 
experiences of many nations' courts and framing them in a matrix portraying 
the intensity of the political and legal constraints that any given court may 
have to confront. 
Using this matrix, he marks the position the Constitutional Court 
occupied during its first decade. He argues, persuasively, that for most of this 
decade the court was in a particularly uncomfortable position, facing serious 
constraints both from the political system and from the legal system's 
demands for adjudication according to law (390). 
The political constraints stemmed in good part from the court's lack of a 
firm hold on South Africans' allegiance: James Gibson's public o pinion 
surveys, cited by Roux (James L Gibson & Gregory A Caldeira 'Defenders of 
democracy? Legitimacy, popular acceptance, and the South African Consti-
tutional Court' (2003) 65 Journal of Politics 1; James L Gibson 'The evolving 
legitimacy of the South African Constitutional Court' in Fran.yois du Bois & 
Antie du Bo is-Pedain (eds) Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa (2008) 229) suggest that the court in these years never attained the level 
of popular support of its peer courts in many other countries (34--5). This is 
not necessarily an indication that the Constitutional Court's efforts to win 
popular legitimacy were in some way deficient; it may simply prove that 
these things take time. But without an independent hold on South Africans ' 
allegiance, the court was vulnerable to political attack if and when it came. 
M oreover, as Roux points out, w hile the ANC initially needed the court's 
imprimatur to legitimise the new Constitution, once that stage of the 
transition was complete, the ANC was freer to chart its own course (144). 
At the same time, Roux argues, the Constitutional Court was notably 
constrained by the boundaries of legal argument. Roux maintains that the 
court needed to establish that it was a legitimate arbite r of South African law 
- and that it 'therefore had to maintain some version of the law/politics 
clistinction as a necessary condition of its independence' (215). (It is possible 
to question whether the Constitutional Court really did need to establish its 
legitimacy in this way, since the polling data suggest that in fact it didn 't fully 
persuade the South African public. But it is quite likely that if the court had 
not sought so determinedly to embody ftdelity to law, its public legitimacy 
would have been even more uncertain than it was.) It seems fair to say that 
even as the court imposed the new idea of constitutional supremacy onto 
South African law (207), it still needed to adhere to the broad conventions of 
careful legal exposition. Moreover, the justices themselves shared this 
understanding of their responsibilities (220). As lawyers and judges w ho had 
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stood against apartheid, they knew that law could be tremendously unjust; at 
the same time, th ey had proven that sometimes the disciplined use of law 
found room for law's ideals to take hold. T he mission of the justices of the 
C haskalson Court was to embody that legal discipline in a new and 
transformative legal order. This was not a conservative undertaking, but it 
was a law-abiding one. 
T hus Roux has established two critical points - he has identified the 
criteria of success for a constitutional court and explained why South Africa's 
court faced special challenges in meeting those criteria. T he next step is to 
explain how the court threaded the needle. 
To this question Roux offers a startling but perceptive answer. He 
maintains that the court's institutional success in fact depended on the assent 
and support of the government, and thus of the ANC (37). T he ANC could 
defend the court against popular disagreement with its decisions, and 
meanwhile the court would naturally have looked to the ANC government 
as the primary mover of the social transformation the nation so urgently 
needed. But the ANC, while it was ' the political actor with ... the most 
effective means of protecting' the court, also had ' the greatest means to 
attack' it (125). T he ANC is a big church, and the court's position depended 
on the pre-eminence within the party of what Roux calls its moderate 
faction. With that faction in control, the political branches would sustain the 
court's position (and obey its decisions). If that faction lost power or its 
perspective shifted, however, then the court's position would at once 
become fragile (160). Therefore the ideal move for the court would have 
been to develop a principled jurisprudence that did not dislodge, or alienate, 
this central component of the ANC. 
Roux then sets out to demonstrate that the court in fact developed this sort of 
j urisprudence. To do so he reviews an array of cases decided by the court, on 
issues fiom the abolition of the death penalty to the provision of nevirapine 
to the regulation of floor-crossing in Parliament. His analyses are rigorous 
and at the same time nuanced: as he acknowledges several times, the 
evidence he seeks is aJways circumstantial. Broadly speaking, his case is that 
the court's many admirable decisions were still founded on reasoning that left 
the court room to avoid unwise confrontations with the government (see e g 
259), while what he sees as its occasional lapses can be attributed directly to 
the institutional delicacy of the matters before it (363). 
Raux's identification of the problem facing the court is persuasive; his 
argument for the characterisation of the court's response is thoughtful too, 
but more contestable. He rightly argues that many of the members of the 
Chaskalson Court were people with poJitical experience and sensitivity 
(220-31), and it makes sense to conclude, on that basis, that the judges had 
considerable understanding of their court's institutional fragility. I do not 
think we can assume, without more biographical evidence, that they were as 
pessimistic about the court's position as Professor Gibson's polling data might 
have counselled. It seems entirely reasonable, however, to infer that the 
judges reached their decisions with this institutional consideration in mind 
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- indeed, as the first members of the country's Constitutional Court, they 
surely were obliged to think about how to perform their duties so as to build 
the rule oflaw in the new South Africa. But it is one thing to say the judges 
were aware of the court's institutional position, and quite another to say that 
their decisions were the result of choices made, perhaps even consciously, for 
institutional rather than legal reasons. 
Roux argues, for instance, that Arthur C haskalson's judgment in S 11 
Makwa11yane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) prefers to focus on the rejection of the 
death penalty in international jurisprudence rather than 'a substantive 
examination of the implications of the Constitution's moral vision for the 
question at hand' (242). One reason to have done this would have been to 
avoid locking in demanding constitutional readings that would have led to 
broad confrontation with the government. But the inference that this was the 
court's reason is necessarily uncertain, for the justices might have been 
concerned not to avoid confrontation but to avoid unwisdom - the kind of 
unwisdom that stems from deciding issues prematurely. T hey might have felt 
that the unconstitutionality of the death penalty was so apparent that its 
abolition did not need to rest on any deeper theorising, and that to undertake 
such theorising would therefore indeed have been premature. They might 
also have doubted the feasibility of a complete theorising of the meaning of 
this or other parts of the Constitution - and I admit to being skeptical about 
the possibility of root-to-branch theoretical structures myself 
Similarly, in his analysis of the famous socio-economic rights cases, Govem-
ment cif the Republic cif South Africnv Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) and Minister 
cif Health 11 Treatment Actio11 Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) ('TAC') , 
Roux argues that TAC, which imposed an actual order rather than just issuing 
a declaration of constitutional invalidity as Grootboom had, failed to lay out a 
justification for this new level of judicial intervention. Instead, Roux points 
out, the court presented the order as constitutionally compelled and as, in fact, 
a reflection of respect for the government, based on the court's recognition 
that ' [t]he government has always executed and respected orders of this Court 
(TAC (supra) para 129, cited at 372-3) . Meanwhile, as Roux recounts, the 
Minister of Health had in fact publicly indicated that an order, if it came, 
would not be obeyed (298). The court's decision to say only what it did surely 
was shaped by a desire not to provoke state resistance. But the diplomacy 
reflected in what the court did and did not say actually seems reminiscent of 
Brown 11 Board cif Educatior1 347 US 483 (1 954), in which the United States 
Supreme Court struck down racial segregation in schools without ever quite 
saying what everyone knew, namely that school segregation was an intentional 
expression of the subordination of African- Americans. 
The example of Brown (supra) points to a broader question: what exactly 
does ruling on the basis of principle require? R oux himself reasons with great 
precision, and it seems fair to say that at least on occasion the Constitutional 
Court wrote in broader and less analytical ways. Suppose that in some of 
these instances the court's reasons for writing in this manner did indeed have 
to do with shaping approaches that would enable it, in the future, to pursue 
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the development of constitutional law in the £1ce of potential state resistance 
better than it would o therwise have been able to - and suppose also that the 
court never put these institutional reasons into consistent, doctrinal form, 
and in fact appeared to draw on one strand or another, more o r less 
inarticulately, based on its sense of the institutional considerations at work in 
a given case. T he next question would be whether that kind of reasoning is a 
departure fi·om ' the path of principle'. 
I do not mean to defend ad hoc and willful decision-making, but at the 
same time I would be reluctant to describe judgments of the so rt I have 
posited as unprincipled. Perhaps that is because this kind of conglomeration 
of doctrinal and institutional concerns is arguably a feature of the work of the 
United States Supreme Court. R oux maintains that the US Supreme Court 
is the 'paradigmatic example' of a ' court in a mature constitu tional democ-
racy in which the ideal of adjudication according to law has for some 
histo rical reason weakened' (110). Elsewhere he describes American ' legal-
professional culture [as] relatively to lerant of consequentialist, policy-based 
reasoning' (1 02). I would resist the view that 'consequentialist, po licy-based 
reasoning' must be something other than 'adjudication according to law'. 
Where R oux discerns departures fi:om the 'path of principle,' l would be 
inclined to find explorations of what might be called the ' current of 
constitutionalism'. T he flow of that current, moreover, would naturally be 
different in a world in which judges see the executive as a partner in the 
constitutional project - as Roux insightfully suggests the C haskalson Court 
did (261, 273) - than in a world in which judges see themselves as locked in 
struggle against the poli ticians of their countty. 
A crucial strength of R a ux's book, however, is that he does no t equate 
deviation fi·om principle with judicial fai lure. Instead, he recognises, and 
emphasises, that the court's task is 1101 to insure that each j udgment of the 
court must be fully principled in term of the conventions of legal argument 
- et ruat caelum. Instead, he builds his book around the proposition that the 
court must succeed bo th legally and institutionally. To him it is a good reason 
- not a lame excuse - for a departure from strict principle that the 
departure helps preserve the court's institutional role, a point he makes most 
tellingly in his discussion of Grootboom (supra) and Tit C (supra) (291-2 and 
302- 3). T hough we differ somewhat in how we demarcate the realms of 
institutional survival and legal argumentation, I very much agree with his 
recognition that the tasks of courts fa ll on both axes and that attending to 
both sets of concerns is not weakness but strength . Roux's insightful book 
lays out this point and then explores its implications in the actual decisions of 
the Constitutional Court, and th erefore is a valuable contribution to our 
understanding both of the achievement of the C haskalson Court, and of the 
c1i tical and delicate role South Afiica's Constitu tional Court, and its 
counterparts elsewhere, must continue to play. 
STEPHEN ELLMANN 
Professor cif La111, New York Law School 
